The aim of this article is to answer the question, ' 
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EJIL 23 (2012), (ECHR), but to concentrate on how national judges treat the ECHR compared with how they treat EU norms. While there is a massive literature analysing either the issue of the national application of EU law or that of ECHR norms, a specific comparative analysis which takes into account the national judicial treatment of both laws is still lacking.
This investigation will concern some selected constitutional experiences. It will be ascertained whether national judges treat ECHR and EU law similarly, and to what extent they facilitate their convergence. In this respect, my purpose is to study the judicial application of the ECHR and EU law to analyse the vertical relationship between national judges (constitutional and ordinary alike) and these external legal sources. As such, I am not interested in the horizontal convergence between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the CJEU. Obviously, these two dynamics are strongly related, and both European Courts have undergone deep transformations, especially after the enlargements of the EU and the Council of Europe.
This article builds on a well known premise: according to many scholars, a huge distinction exists between the ECHR and EU laws, as Lord Hoffmann recently pointed out: 1 The fact that the 10 original Member States of the Council of Europe subscribed to a statement of human rights in the same terms did not mean that they had agreed to uniformity of the application of those abstract rights in each of their countries, still less in the 47 states which now belong. The situation is quite different from that of the European Economic Community, in which the Member States agreed that it was in their economic interest to have uniform laws on particular matters which were specified as being within European competence. On such matters, the European institutions, including the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, were given a mandate to unify the laws of Europe. The Strasbourg court, on the other hand, has no mandate to unify the laws of Europe on the many subjects which may arguably touch upon human rights . . . The proposition that the Convention is a 'living instrument' is the banner under which the Strasbourg court has assumed power to legislate what they consider to be required by European public order.
Nevertheless, after a detailed analysis of the national case law, I argue that we are already dealing (regardless of the EU's possible accession to the ECHR) with a partial convergence in the application of EU and ECHR's norms.
This article is comprised of three parts. The first offers an overview of the 'constitutional variety' of constitutional provisions governing ECHR and EU norms' impact on national systems. The second part will examine the relevant national case law under three aspects of potential convergence: consistent interpretation, disapplication of national norms/provisions conflicting with European provisions (a symptom of ECHR provisions' direct effect), and the emergence of counter-limits doctrines. Finally, in the third part I will provide some concluding remarks on the convergence hypothesis.
Is the European Convention Going to Be 'Supreme'?
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Looking at the constitutional provisions governing the effects of the ECHR norms on domestic orders, one can appreciate the variety of ways in which to conceive the relationship between the national and European constitutional levels.
A gap exists between the formal status of ECHR norms and their real value and nature. I would describe this gap as distinguishing between a 'static approach' (what national constitutions say) and a 'dynamic approach' (concerned with the actual force of these laws, as emerges in the case law). 2 Another caveat should be made at this point: I focus on the activity of those national courts that have vehemently contributed to making the CJEU change or to readjust its doctrines. However, it would be possible to find other similar cases in other legal contexts. In a recent book, Keller and Stone Sweet 4 underscored the variety of national constitutional provisions regarding the ECHR. Indeed, looking at these provisions (and those applicable to EU law) one easily appreciates the diversity of national approaches with respect to the domestic authority of European laws:
1. First, some constitutions reserve a particular status to EU law, distinguishing it from 'normal' public international law. An example is Italy, where Article 117 of the Constitution states: '[l]egislative power belongs to the state and the regions in accordance with the constitution and within the limits set by European Union law and international obligations'. Accordingly, many commentators 5 have stressed the distinction between the effects of EU obligations and international ones. 2. Secondly, some constitutions acknowledge the special status of international human rights treaties (or some of them). In Spain and Portugal (see, respectively, Article 10 of the Spanish Constitution 6 and Article 16 of the Portuguese Constitution) such declarations provide an interpretative support for constitutional human rights provisions. 3. Thirdly, some constitutions seem not to distinguish between international and EU law. ). b) In some states, instead, the ECHR has a super-legislative ranking (e.g., in France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal). c) In other states (the UK), finally, the ECHR has a legislative ranking. Countries like Italy and Germany seemingly belong in the third group (if one reads their constitutions) but local Constitutional Courts clarified that the ECHR has a special force that exceeds the normal constitutional discipline of international norms.
Despite all these differences, recent scholarship has pointed to the progressive rapprochement between the European domestic orders with regard to the 'position' of the ECHR in the national hierarchy of sources. This convergence is the final outcome of different national pathways; sometimes national legislators must be credited, in other circumstances it is rather Constitutional or Supreme Courts, or even ordinary judges. This is irrespective of the formal position set out in the constitution, or of the dualism or monism classification.
10
The ECHR is generally acknowledged to have supra-legislative force, but its relationship with constitutional supremacy is more controversial, as discussed below.
B A First Look at the Relationship between EU and National Laws
A similar variety can also be found in the domestic treatment of EU law. One can identify several 'strategies' used to ensure EU law's primacy: (a) Some states embrace a monist vision of the relationship between orders, implying the unconditional acceptance of EU law (the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg). In the Netherlands, for example, Article 94 of the Basic Law -according to a generally accepted interpretation 11 -provides that international law is not only part of, but is also superior to, any domestic law. The same applies to EU law. (b) Other states expressly constitutionalize a set of limits to European integration (Germany, 12 Sweden
13
). The German text is particularly meaningful, because 7 E.g., Montanari, supra note 2.
8
As Cede pointed out, 'The ECHR has a double status in Austria. In addition to its character as an international treaty, it has been transformed, on the domestic level, into a law with the rank of a constitutional act. This has a twofold implication. First, the ECHR grants individual rights that are directly actionable before all courts and authorities. Given their status as constitutional law, these rights may be relied upon before the CC': Cede, 'Report on Austria and Germany', in Martinico and Pollicino (eds), supra note 3, at 55, 63. 22 and 8 of the Polish Constitution). In these cases, however, national constitutional courts emphasized the 'souveranism' of the constitution to confirm its full primacy.
Is the European Convention Going to
23
This is just a possible categorization of the constitutional frameworks in Member States. Despite this variety and although there are sporadic cases of judicial resistance, 24 as was noted, 25 EU law is applied in all jurisdictions uniformly, as primacy and direct effect are accepted by all national courts.
26
'(2) The ratification and promulgation of the treaty referred to in Subsection (1) shall be subject to a two-thirds majority vote of the Parliament, which was introduced after the constitutional reform of 2002 together with other provisions, including Article 6. Article 2/A makes EU membership contingent upon the protection of fundamental rights and the respect of national competences.' Art. 6, p. 4 of the Hungarian Constitution states, 'The Republic of Hungary shall take an active part in establishing a European unity in order to achieve freedom, well-being and security for the peoples of Europe'. As Sonnevend put it, ' As regards the protection of fundamental rights, Art. 2/A of the Constitution stipulates that only "competencies resulting from the Constitution" may be exercised together with the other Member States, or by the Community institutions. Undoubtedly, this is a nemo plus iuris rule: it provides that the exercise of powers by the Union is subject to the same constitutional barriers as are applicable to the Republic of Hungary and its organs. Since the organs of the Republic lack the power to violate fundamental rights of the individuals, no such power can be transferred to the EU. As regards the scope of competences transferred to the EU, Art. 2/A(1) of the Constitution provides that only those powers may be exercised by the EU that are necessary to exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations resulting from the founding treaties. This language makes it clear that Art. 2/A does not legitimize those sovereign acts of the EU that are not founded on a competence resulting from the treaties. Ultra vires acts are therefore not covered by the integration clause': Sonnevend, 'Report on Hungary', in Martinico and Pollicino (eds), supra note 3, at 251, 256. 19 Art. 8 (Poland): '(1) The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic of Poland.
(2) The provisions of the Constitution shall apply directly, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.' 20 See Jarukaitis, 'Report on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania', in Martinico and Pollicino (eds), supra note 3, at 167. 
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Dealing with Law in Action
As Keller and Stone Sweet argued, 27 the situation is not much different for the ECHR from what I have just explained regarding EU law. To support this claim it is necessary to go beyond the wording of formal provisions and observe how national judges treat these European laws.
The first common element of these two European regimes is the crucial role of national judges, who are the real 'natural judges' of both, for different reasons. They are the first guardians of the Simmenthal doctrine for EU law 28 and, at the same time, the first adjudicators of the ECHR in national systems, due to the principle of subsidiarity.
This is a crucial point of this research, dealing with both ECHR and EU law. To provide a comparative overview, I will treat the following judicial practices in turn:
(a) consistent interpretation (a consequence of the 'indirect effect' of supranational laws); (b) disapplication of domestic law (the consequence of supra-national laws' direct effect/primacy); (c) counter-limits doctrine (setting a limit to supra-national law's supremacy).
A Consistent Interpretation
A first analogy in the national judicial treatment of these two European laws may be found in the interpretive superiority accorded to the EU/ECHR by national judges independently of what national constitutions provide about their status in the domestic legal order. There are at least three different orders of reasons for this:
1. constitutional provisions (Spain, Romania); 2. legislative provisions (UK); 3. constitutional courts' case law (Italy and Germany). This is a reflection of the constitutional variety described above. Sometimes the language of domestic constitutions conveys a message of reaction to totalitarian experiences, e.g., in the form of an increased openness to international law and the acknowledgment of peace as a fundamental constitutional principle, not simply as a strategic foreign policy option. In Spain 29 and Portugal 30 constitutional courts run a preventive check on the constitutionality of international treaties. In Spain, when a conflict arises the Constitution must be amended before the stipulation of the treaty. In Portugal, instead, in order to be ratified the treaty must be approved by the Assembly of the Republic with a special majority. 31 Treaties may be subject to constitutional review even after ratification. According to the literature, the particular 27 Keller and Stone Sweet, supra note 9, at 685-686. 28 Claes, supra note 26. 29 Art. 95(2) Constitution. 30 Art. 278 Constitution. 31 Art. 279(4) Constitution.
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EJIL 23 (2012), domestic force of treaties in the domestic legal order can be inferred by Article 8 of the Portuguese Constitution and Article 96 of the Spanish one, although these two provisions seemingly regulate treaties' validity rather than their efficacy. 32 Nevertheless, the most important confirmation of human rights treaties' special ranking in Spain is Article 10.2, 33 acknowledging that they provide interpretive guidance in the application of human rights-related constitutional clauses (even if the Constitutional Court specified that this does not imply that human rights treaties have constitutional status 34 ). As for Portugal, the fundamental provision is Article 16 of the Constitution, 35 which recognizes that international human rights treaties have a role which is complementary to the Constitution. This provision accords an interpretative role to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, seemingly excluding other conventions like the ECHR. In 1982, an attempt to insert a reference to the ECHR into the Constitution failed, but the Portuguese Constitutional Court often used the ECHR as an important auxiliary hermeneutic tool for interpreting the Constitution, leaving the matter unresolved. 36 A similar provision is Article 20(1) of the Romanian Constitution: '[c]onstitutional provisions concerning the citizens' rights and liberties shall be interpreted and enforced in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the covenants and other treaties Romania is a party to'.
Article 5 of the Bulgarian Constitution 37 recognizes a general precedence of international law (including the ECHR and EU law) over national law, and also covers the duty to interpret national law in a manner which is consistent with these regimes (and the case law of their respective courts). In 1998, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court ruled that:
The Convention constitutes a set of European common values which is of a significant importance for the legal systems of the Member States and consequently the interpretation of the constitutional provisions relating to the protection of human rights has to be made to the extent possible in accordance with the corresponding clauses of the Convention. ). More generally, consistent interpretation is a typical doctrine of multilevel systems, 41 since it guarantees some flexibility in the relationship between laws of different orders and entrusts judges with the role of gatekeepers (see Hermés   42 and Dior, 43 on the relationship between EU and WTO laws). Traditionally, the literature conceives consistent interpretation as an indirect effect since it confirms the primacy of EU law, giving a sort of interpretive priority to EU law norms, especially when the conflicts between norms cannot be resolved by using the Simmenthal doctrine because of the absence of direct effect for the EU provisions.
It is a well-known story which does not need repeating. The only thing I would like to point out is the increasing importance of consistent interpretation in EU law, as recently stressed by Rodin: 44 the Simmenthal doctrine is a rigid one which requires a unilateral conclusion in case of constitutional conflict (i.e., conflict between constitutional supremacy and the primacy of European law), while the consistent interpretation makes it possible to neutralize or soften constitutional conflicts, where this is possible, of course.
The duty to interpret national law consistently with the ECHR provisions is sometimes based on legislative provisions, as in the UK, under the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. In 1998, the ECHR was incorporated into the HRA, containing a selective incorporation of the ECHR's rights (the so-called 'Convention Rights'). Section 3 45 sets out the necessity to interpret domestic law 'so far as is possible' in conformity with the Convention.
The proposed schematization -i.e., the statutory source of the consistent interpretation obligation -may be contested, however, since there are some recent English cases where the HRA was treated as a part of the 'constitutional core'. This is precisely what happened in Thoburn. 46 In this judgment, Laws LJ recognized the existence of a constitutional group of statutes and Acts which included the European Communities Act 1972: 39 In the present state of its maturity the common law has come to recognise that there exist rights which should properly be classified as constitutional or fundamental . . . We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were 'ordinary' statutes and 'constitutional' statutes. The two categories must be distinguished on a principled basis. In my opinion a constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights. (a) and (b) are of necessity closely related: it is difficult to think of an instance of (a) that is not also an instance of (b).
The Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights of 1689, the Act of Union of 1707, the Reform Acts, the HRA 1998, the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998, and the European Communities Act 1972 all belong to the category of 'constitutional' statutes. Looking at the judges' reasoning, it is possible to appreciate a further effort to reconcile the primacy of EU law (now vested with constitutional status) with parliamentary sovereignty. According to this judgment, in fact, EU law's primacy is based on Parliament's self-limitation; in other words, the legal basis of the UK's relationship with the EU rests on national provisions, not on EU law:
There is nothing in the [European Communities Act] which allows the Court of Justice, or any other institutions of the EU, to touch or qualify the conditions of Parliament's legislative supremacy in the United Kingdom. Not because the legislature chose not to allow it; because by our law it could not allow it.
Finally, in the absence of express written provisions (either constitutional or statutory) the duty to interpret national law in light of the ECHR can sometimes derive from the Constitutional Court's case law, as in Germany and Italy. In Germany, the Second Senate of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BvG) in 2004 47 clarified the relationship between the BvG and the ECtHR, and somehow followed up the Strasbourg Court's decision Görgülü v. Germany. 48 As explained in the literature, 49 this judgment must be connected to another instance of judicial conflict between the two courts, the Hannover v. Germany case. 50 On that occasion, the two courts had interpreted the right to privacy differently. The BvG thus in 2004 seized the opportunity to bring some clarity: the ECHR and the ECtHR's case law bind the Federal Republic only as a public international law subject. The ECHR was ratified as ordinary law and, therefore, it can be derogated from by any subsequent ordinary statute and cannot serve as a standard of constitutional review (i.e., one cannot claim the violation of conventional rights before the BvG).
However, the case law of the Strasbourg Court may be referred to when interpreting the constitution, if this does not entail a limitation of another constitutional right. and 24), obliging national judges to take into account the law and case law of the Convention and to interpret domestic norms in the light thereof, but only if this is possible (and providing reasons when failing to do so).
Recently, in May 2011, 51 the BvG held preventive detention to be unconstitutional, basing its expansive interpretation of the Grundgesetz on the case law of the Strasbourg judges.
52
In Italy, in two fundamental decisions of 2007 the Constitutional Court 53 clarified the position of the ECHR in the domestic legal system. Without going into details, 54 the nucleus of these decisions can be summarized as follows:
1. The Convention has a super-primary value (i.e., its normative ranking is halfway between statutes and constitutional norms); 2. In some cases, the ECHR can serve as 'interposed parameter' for the constitutional review of primary laws, since the conflict between them and the ECHR can entail an indirect violation of the Constitution; 3. This (no. 2) does not imply that the ECHR has a constitutional value; on the contrary, the ECHR has to respect the Constitution; 4. The ECHR cannot be treated domestically like EU law, as explained below; 5. The constitutional favour accorded to the ECHR implies the obligation to interpret national law in light of ECHR's norms.
In conclusion, it emerges that the technique of consistent interpretation is being extended from EU law to the ECHR, following different paths (constitutional, legislative, and judicial). This does not mean that the convergence is perfect: for instance, it is not always clear whether the duty to interpret national law in light of the ECHR includes the need to take into account the case law of the ECtHR. In this respect, there are different answers. Formally, the abovementioned Constitutions are silent on this, while the UK's HRA expressly provides (section 2) that: '[a] court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any -(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights'. In Italy and Germany, as seen above, it is the Constitutional Court that gave instructions to this effect. A last word on these cases: the constitutional provisions providing for the duty of consistent interpretation do not distinguish between the ECHR and other international 51 treaties on human rights, whereas when this doctrine is based on legislation and judicial decisions the ECHR enjoys ad hoc treatment. I turn now to other jurisdictions. In the Baltic countries, the ECHR is deemed a source of inspiration for the construction 55 of national (including constitutional) law, and was cited by the constitutional courts of these countries even before their accession to the ECHR. 56 This is the case in Lithuania as well as Latvia, where the Court expressly agreed to be bound by the ECtHR's case law 57 even when it interprets its own Constitution.
58
Likewise, the Estonian Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the ECHR's priority over national law, 59 and its own duty to bear in mind the ECtHR's case law.
60
The Belgian Cour Constitutionnelle uses the technique of consistent interpretation, taking into account the case law of both European Courts and showing its readiness even to revise its previous case law, if need be. 61 Finally, the Supreme Courts of the Nordic countries have acknowledged EU and ECHR law's special role. 62 They have accorded to these regimes a sort of interpretative priority, and used consistent interpretation and indirect effects doctrines to avoid constitutional conflicts between national and supranational laws.
B Judicial Disapplication of Domestic Law: Simmenthal Reloaded?
As already noted, the national judge has been considered the first guarantor of EU law's primacy, since the Simmenthal judgment of the ECJ:
Any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the very essence of Community law. All these cases and those in the footnotes immediately below are reported more fully than on the courts' websites in Jarukaitis, supra note 56. 57 From these lines one can infer: (a) the connection between EC (now EU) law's primacy/precedence and the duty to disapply conflicting national law; (b) the crucial role of domestic judges in ensuring primacy. In this section, I will show a second similarity in the national use of European laws, reflected in the judicial treatment of conflicts between domestic norms and EU/ECHR norms according to the Simmenthal doctrine, applied to ECHR law by analogy. Here again, we can find different reasons for this phenomenon (and the variety of constitutional provisions analysed above proves critical):
In some cases, the extension of the disapplication practice can be explained on constitutional bases (France, the Netherlands), In other cases, instead, such extension has been devised by the genius of domestic (common) judges (e.g. in Italy).
In some countries there are constitutional provisions empowering national judges to disapply national law that conflicts with international treaties. In France (where the Constitution stipulates the superiority of treaties), there are no specific provisions concerning human rights treaties, and all the provisions in the Constitution's Title VI -regarding the entry into force of international treaties -are applicable to the ECHR. The domestic super-legislative ranking of international treaties is inferable from Article 55, 64 which provides that ratified treaties are superior to domestic legislation. The review of the conformity of national law with international treaties (control of 'conventionnalité') is entrusted to national judges.
Unlike France, many Eastern European Countries have entrusted this control to constitutional courts, causing a certain degree of convergence between the control of constitutionality and that of 'conventionnalité'. 65 A similar mechanism -with the important difference of the absence of judicial review of legislation -is the Dutch model, 66 based on Articles 91 and 93 of the Grondwet (the Basic Law). 67 The clearest 69 this Article also refers to constitutional provisions. 70 In any case, Article 94 entitles national judges to review the conventionality of national law, even though they are not allowed to review the constitutionality of the statutory norms under Article 120 of the Grondwet. 71 In essence, in both France and the Netherlands the convergence between EU and ECHR law is due to a set of constitutional instructions which seem not to distinguish between public international law and EU law. 72 The second case of extension of the Simmenthal doctrine to the ECHR -the Italian case -is completely different, in terms of scope and reasons. As widely noted, 73 Italian common (comuni) judges started disapplying domestic norms conflicting with the ECHR. 74 In 2007, the Corte Costituzionale resolved to stop this trend, which constituted an undue 'constitutional exception' to constitutional supremacy, and derogated from centralized constitutional review. The Constitutional Court, to hinder this practice and ensure at the same time the ECHR's supra-statutory status, agreed for the first time to assess the validity of national provisions using the ECHR standard. The Corte, therefore, extended the doctrine of the 'interposed norm' ('norma interposta').
75
In essence, it sent this message to common judges: 'instead of disapplying, refer a preliminary question of constitutionality to the Constitutional Court!'. The Court's argument hinged upon the distinction between ECHR and EU law:
according to the constitutional judges, the ECHR legal system has distinct structural and functional legal features as compared to the European legal order. . . . [in their view,] the EHCR is a multilateral international public law Treaty which does not entail and cannot entail any limitation on sovereignty in the terms provided by Article 11 of the Constitution.
76
This explains the different treatment reserved to the ECHR, as regards the practice of disapplication and the necessity that the Convention be consistent with the whole Constitution, not just with the counter-limits (i.e., those fundamental principles forming an untouchable constitutional core).
Quite surprisingly, after the intervention of the Constitutional Court, some ordinary judges kept disapplying national provisions conflicting with the ECHR 77 for various reasons:
1. Sometimes the judges seemed not to understand the Constitutional Court's Diktat, or not to know the difference between the ECHR and EU law; 78 2. In other cases, the judges duly recalled the Corte Costituzionale's instructions, yet misunderstood the meaning of the new (post-Lisbon) Article 6 TEU, which paves the way for the EU's accession to the ECHR. In other words, they thought that the ECHR has (already) become part of EU law ipso iure, after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and, therefore, now had direct effect and primacy. This is perhaps the case in a judgment of the Consiglio di Stato It is possible to see the Italian case as a demonstration that a problem of application of 'external' law in a multilevel legal system might result in an 'internal' judicial conflict (Constitutional Court versus ordinary judges).
81
There are other interesting (yet less clear-cut) cases: in Bulgaria, for instance. National judges are considered the first defenders of the ECHR's precedence over national law under Article 5.4 of the Constitution. Both common judges and the 76 Pollicino, supra note 55. 77 Carlotto, 'I giudici comuni e gli obblighi internazionali dopo le sentenze n. 348 e n. 349 del 2007 della Corte costituzionale: un'analisi sul seguito giurisprudenziale', available at: www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it; E. Lamarque, 'Il vincolo alle leggi statali e regionali derivante dagli obblighi internazionali nella giurisprudenza comune', available at: http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it. 78 Tribunale di Livorno, Sez. Lav., Order of 28 Oct. 2008. See Carlotto, supra note 78. 79 Consiglio di Stato, judgment of. 2 Mar. 2010, n. 1220. On this decision see Colavitti and Pagotto, 'Il Consiglio di Stato applica direttamente le norme CEDU grazie al Trattato di Lisbona: l'inizio di un nuovo percorso?', available at: www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/rivista/2010/00/Colavitti-Pagotto01. pdf (2010). 80 Tribunale di Ravenna, 16 Jan. 2008. On this see Carlotto, supra note 78. 81 For a wider analysis coming to this conclusion see ibid.: Lamarque, supra note 78.
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EJIL 23 (2012), Constitutional Court are seemingly entitled to carry out the contrôle de conventionnalité, 82 but scholars have noticed 83 a certain reluctance on the part of ordinary judges:
The national courts prefer to decide that the case pending before them doesn't fall into a field of these two international instruments. Nevertheless, two comments should be made. First, this position does reveal a certain difficulty to solve potential conflicts between the domestic law and European instruments. Second, the national courts do still prefer to apply the relevant domestic law instead of the relevant international clauses. One of the reasons is that the judges' knowledge of these instruments is still insufficient.
84
The Bulgarian Constitutional Court has recognized the priority of the Constitution over EU and ECHR law, but also admitted that the Constitution is to be interpreted as far as possible in light of ECHR law. This solution has been described as the paradoxical consequence 85 of the wording of Article 149 of the Constitution (namely, of the combination of paragraphs (2) and (4)), which governs both the control of constitutionality (paragraph 2) and of conventionnalité (paragraph 4). These kinds of review, indeed, were deemed to differ in terms of purpose and scope. 86 In Portugal, theoretically, it can be argued that Articles 204 87 and 8 88 of the Constitution, combined, entitle national judges to disapply national law conflicting with constitutional and international law, but scholars describe this possibility as a sort of 'sleeping giant' that has never woken up. . rule on the compatibility between the Constitution and the international treaties concluded by the Republic of Bulgaria prior to their ratification, and on the compatibility of domestic laws with the universally recognized norms of international law and the international treaties to which Bulgaria is a party.' 83 Fartunova, supra note 39, at 109. 84 Ibid., at 108-109. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Art. 204 Constitution: 'In matters that are brought to trial, the courts shall not apply rules that contravene the provisions of this Constitution or the principles enshrined therein.' 88 Art. 8 Constitution:
'1. The rules and principles of general or common international law shall form an integral part of Portuguese law. 2. The rules set out in duly ratified or passed international agreements shall come into force in Portuguese internal law once they have been officially published, and shall remain so for as long as they are internationally binding on the Portuguese state. On the domestic effects of the ECHR another interesting provision is Article 96 of the Spanish Constitution, the meaning of which is a matter of debate: does it empower judges to disapply national legislation in conflict with ECHR provisions? Granted, according to the Constitutional Tribunal, Spanish judges may disapply national laws conflicting with international treaties, 90 although the possible disapplication of national law for conflict with human rights treaties like the ECHR appears to be more problematic, and the Constitutional Tribunal has never pronounced on this issue.
Since the Constitutional Tribunal has demonstrated its willingness to take the ECHR into account -via Article 10.2 of the Constitution -scholars suggested that ordinary judges should refer a question to the Constitutional Tribunal when conflict arose, rather than disapply national law. 91 This view also hinges upon the distinction between normal international treaties (Article 96) and human rights treaties (Article 10).
Finally, there are states where disapplication is forbidden: in the UK, for instance, in case of conflict between primary legislation and the Convention, judges can only adopt a 'declaration of incompatibility', 92 which does not influence the validity and the efficacy of the domestic norm. After such a declaration, 'if a Minister of the Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for proceeding . . . he may by order make such amendments to the legislation as he considers necessary to remove the incompatibility' (HRA, section 10). 93 Regardless of whether disapplication is allowed or practised to ensure the implementation of ECHR norms, in all jurisdictions the Convention is apparently provided, at least, with a sort of 'direct effect' (i.e., the other structural principle of EU law, together with primacy). In this respect, the Austrian case is significant, as Keller ECHR, which confirms the necessity to go beyond the wording of the constitutional texts in the present investigation. It appears that the situation has not changed much since the 1980s, when Neville Brown and McBride argued that the attribution of the direct effect to the provisions of the ECHR is a matter for the national constitutions to decide on. 96 At the same time, as we saw, there are cases in which, notwithstanding the ambiguity of the national constitutions, direct effect is recognized to the ECHR provisions: the Belgian case is emblematic, as shown in Franco Suisse Le Ski. 97 That is why, today, despite the literal wording of the Constitution, some scholars consider both the European laws (i.e., the ECHR and EU law) to be 'supranational'.
98 Even in Luxembourg, over the years, courts have confirmed the 'the directly self-executing character of many of the Convention's provisions'.
99 'Hence, the ECHR and its Protocols are considered to be directly applicable in the Luxembourg legal order'. 100 However, the most evident case of this trend is the situation of Scandinavian countries, where '[t]he EC/EU/EEA law in Scandinavian law and the ECtHR are regarded as lex superior, despite [the fact] that the explicit formal basis for that remains limited. The special character of European law within domestic law in Scandinavia (except for the ECHR in Norway and Sweden) tends to be expressed through judicial practice rather than through acknowledgment of their constitutional role'. 101 have constitutional status. Soon afterwards, a constitutional Act was passed modifying the Constitution and acknowledging the constitutional value of the ECHR (Art. II BvG (BGBl 1964/59). Later, the Constitutional Court acknowledged the interpretative value of such clause, giving it a retroactive effect ('[t]he ECHR has a double status in Austria. In addition to its character as an international treaty, it has been transformed, on the domestic level, into a law with the rank of a constitutional act. This has a twofold implication. First, the ECHR grants individual rights that are directly actionable before all courts and authorities. Given their status as constitutional law, these rights may be relied upon before the CC': Cede, supra note 8, at 63). As a consequence, today it is possible to say that the ECHR 'has the rank of directly applicable federal constitutional law'. Confirmation of the constitutional status of the ECHR is derived from the complementary nature of this document (with regard to the constitutional text). This is the real criterion for evaluating its ranking in the legal sources of the national system despite the procedure followed to incorporate them, and that explains why the ECHR had, de facto, constitutional rank even before 1964.
96
' An individual could not however rely upon any provisions of the ECHR in a national court unless it was "capable of conferring rights on citizens of the Community which they can invoke before the courts". This requirement raises the question whether the ECHR's provisions are of direct effect. The only guide to this is to be found in the decisions of the courts of countries whose constitutions accord the ECHR legal European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign states under the Treaties may, however, not be realised in such a way that the Member States do not retain sufficient space for the political formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life. This applies in particular to areas which shape the citizens' circumstances of life, in particular the private space of their own responsibility and of political and social security, which is protected by the fundamental rights, and to political decisions that particularly depend on previous understanding as regards culture, history and language and which unfold in discourses in the space of a political public that is organised by party politics and Parliament. Essential areas of democratic formative action comprise, inter alia, citizenship, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expenditure including external financing and all elements of encroachment that are decisive for the realisation of fundamental rights, above all as regards intensive encroachments on fundamental rights such as the deprivation of liberty in the administration of criminal law or the placement in an institution. These important areas also include cultural issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstances concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of opinion, of the press and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or ideology.
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The BvG thus contributed significantly to defining the meaning of Article 4 TEU, 124 namely elucidating the concept of 'national identity' (already used in Article 6(3) TEU, previous version).
Even in legal orders lacking a fully fledged constitutional text, like the UK, 125 judges limited the openness granted to the ECHR. Emblematically, in Horncastle, the Supreme Court 126 said:
The requirement to 'take into account' the Strasbourg jurisprudence will normally result in this Court applying principles that are clearly established by the Strasbourg Court. There will, however, be rare occasions where this court has concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to this court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course. This is likely to give the Strasbourg Court the opportunity to reconsider the particular aspect of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes place what may prove to be a valuable dialogue between this court and the Strasbourg Court. This is such a case.
EJIL 23 (2012), to engage in the constructive dialogue . . . which is of value to the development of Convention law. Of course, we should usually follow a clear and constant line of decisions . . . But we are not actually bound to do so or (in theory, at least) to follow a decision of the Grand Chamber . . . Where, however, there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it would be wrong for this Court not to follow that line.
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In Austria, where the ECHR enjoys constitutional status, this Convention-friendliness cannot justify a violation of the Constitution. 129 In this sense, some authors 130 have compared the Görgülü judgment to the Miltner case, 131 where the Austrian Constitutional Court stressed the possibility of departing from the ECtHR's case law if adherence thereto would entail a violation of the Constitution.
The Italian Constitutional Court came to a similar conclusion in 2007 (decisions 348 and 349), where it clarified that the ECHR has a privileged position, but enjoys no 'constitutional immunity'; on the contrary, it must abide by all constitutional norms. The Italian judges equated the ECHR with any source of international law and found, accordingly, that the 'constitutional tolerance' of the Italian system towards the ECHR is lower than that towards EU law. This difference in degree is clearly visible: whereas the 'counter-limits' against the penetration of EU law are a subset of constitutional rights (which means that EU law prevails over non-core constitutional values), the Italian court is stricter with the Convention, requiring its conformity with every constitutional norm: 'the need for a constitutionality test on the Convention norm excludes the possibility of having a limited set of fundamental rights that could serve as a counter-limit; indeed, every norm of the Constitution shall be respected by the international norm challenged'.
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Final Remarks
This article provides a first comparison of the national judicial treatment of EU law and the ECHR. In order to see whether national judges are treating the ECHR and EU law similarly I focused on three judicial practices: the consistent interpretation, disapplication of national norms, and counter-limits doctrines. A first analogy is interpretive favour accorded to these laws by national judges independently of what the constitutions provide about their status in the hierarchy of domestic legal sources (among others, see 2 BvR 1481/04; Corte Costituzionale, Nos. 348 and 349/2007). For instance, in France, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, and in other European states, the practice of consistent interpretation is widely used for both these laws, to solve the antinomies existing between national and ECHR and EU law alike.
